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Abstract 
 
Previous studies have documented the tendency for the commercial banking sector of 
many developing economies to be highly liquid and be characterised by a persistently 
high interest rate spread.  This paper embeds these stylised facts in an oligopoly model of 
the banking firm.  The paper derives both the loan and deposit rates as a mark up rate 
over a relatively safe foreign interest rate.  Then, using a diagrammatic framework, the 
paper provides an analysis of: (i) the distribution of financial surplus among savers, 
business borrowers and banks; (ii) exogenous deposit shocks; (iii) exogenous loan 
demand shocks; and (iv) the impact of interest rate control on financial intermediation.     
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1. Introduction 
 
The paper presents an application of an oligopolistic model of the banking firm to 
developing economies.  Klein (1971) provided an early monopolistic theoretical 
framework of the banking firm, which was later applied and extended in various 
directions by Slovin and Sushka (1983) and Hannan (1991).  An oligopolistic version of 
the Klein monopolistic banking model was presented by Frexias and Rochet (1999).  This 
article applies the framework of Frexias and Rochet to analyse banking in developing 
economies. In particular, banks are postulated to mark up the loan rate over a relatively 
risk-free foreign interest rate plus domestic marginal cost of bank production.  As the 
typical developing economy is open and without an internationally recognisable reserve 
currency, the banks must decide whether to make loans domestically or invest in a 
relatively low risk foreign asset.  Thus the foreign interest rate is fundamental to the 
domestic structure of interest rates.   
 
                                                 
1 A previous version of this paper was presented at the 41st Annual Monetary Studies Conference in 
Guyana (Nov 2009) and at the 79st Annual Conference (Nov 2009) of the Southern Economic Association, 
San Antonio Texas. I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from conference participants and two 
anonymous referees. Errors which might remain are my responsibility.   
 2
In addition, the deposit rate is a mark up over the risk-free foreign rate.  This is 
because the bank with oligopolistic market power would need to mobilise deposits in 
local and foreign currency. The deposits are then used by banks to make loans or invest 
in foreign assets; or banks hold excess liquidity. However, before investing in foreign 
assets, the typical bank would need to use deposits to purchase foreign currency from the 
domestic foreign exchange market2.  It is therefore in the interest of banks to ensure that 
the domestic deposit rate is attractive relative to the foreign interest rate so as to be able 
to mobilise funds in local currency and foreign currency deposits when possible. 
 
The analysis that follows postulates there is an asymmetry in the determination of 
the rate of interest; in other words, banks determine the deposit and lending rates and the 
public accepts the rate as given.  This stems from the fact that commercial banks are the 
dominant financial firms in the financial system of the developing world and this 
institutional feature is likely to persist indefinitely.  The latter point was underscored long 
ago by Stiglitz (1989, 61) when he wrote: “LDCs must expect that firms within their 
economies will have to rely heavily on bank lending, rather than securities markets, as 
sources of funds. While it may do little harm to try to promote the growth of securities 
markets, both markets for equities and long-term bonds, these are likely to promote only 
a small fraction of funds firms require.”  The latter point was reinforced more recently by 
the findings of de la Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler (2007) that equity markets in 
developing economies are suffering from delisting and high concentration, with only a 
few stocks dominating market capitalisation and trading.  Therefore, the study of 
oligopoly banking and the role they play in financial intermediation – especially in 
developing economies – is still an important endeavour that needs some attention.   
 
It is often noted that financial deregulation and openness ought to make the 
domestic banking sector contestable and therefore competitive, thereby diminishing the 
asymmetry in ability of financial institutions to determine interest rates.  But it should be 
noted that in most cases foreign banks enter to do business in the domestic market and 
not always to set up offshore banking in the nebulous external markets.  Each branch of a 
multinational bank must pull its own weight and is not likely to be subsidised indefinitely 
by the parent company.  Therefore, entry into the developing economy is ultimately 
restricted by the capacity of that country to generate profitable business opportunities.  In 
the end, the size of the economy and the level of development act as natural entry 
barriers. Hence, banks are likely to possess some degree of market power in determining 
interest rates – in this case the loan and deposit rates.  The purpose of this paper is to 
analyse what the asymmetry in the ability to set interest rates means for distribution and 
financial intermediation.        
 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents some stylised facts to 
motivate the diagrammatic presentation of the model.  Section 3 derives the mark up 
                                                 
2 It would be helpful to note that the foreign exchange market in most developing economies is not 
integrated with the external markets because most countries do not possess a global reserve currency.  So 
for instance the quantity of US dollars or Euros traded in Jamaica or Guyana (against the local currency) is 
determined by that country’s capacity to earn hard currencies.  The quantity of foreign exchange in the 
domestic market would be a function of the country’s exports, remittances, and other capital inflows.      
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interest rates and sets up the market equilibrium conditions.  Section 4 examines such 
issues as distribution, intermediation and interest rate control using a diagrammatic 
approach.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Stylised Facts 
  
It has been recognised for quite some time that interest rate spread – the 
difference between the lending rate and the deposit rate – is quite high in developing 
economies.  The spread has tended to persist in a post-liberalised environment also and it 
has been documented by several authors; see for instance Chirwa and Mlachila (2004), 
Moore and Craigwell (2002), and Gelos (2006).  In general high bank overhead cost of 
production, market power3 and high liquidity levels are seen as key factors driving the 
persistent spread in the post-reform period.  Commercial banks in developing economies 
also hold a high ratio of liquid assets – excess reserves and domestic government 
securities – in their asset portfolio.  This key stylised fact is documented by Saxegaard 
(2006), Fielding and Shortland (2005) and Khemraj (2010).   
  
Figure 1 shows that there is a positive relationship between excess bank liquidity 
and interest rate spread.  On the vertical axis is the percentage interest rate spread; while 
on the horizontal axis is the ratio of bank liquid assets to total assets.  Both series were 
obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  The scatter plot is 
based on 52 developing economies (the list of countries is presented in Appendix 1).  The 
average spread and liquid asset ratio is calculated by averaging the annual rates for the 
period 1996 to 2007.  The latter time period is chosen to represent the post-reform era of 
different parts of the world; in other words, the period minimises the bias of financial 
repression on bank behaviour and it corresponds with heightened financial reforms and 
innovations around the world (see de la Torre, Gozzi and Schmukler 2007).   
 
Moreover, a rudimentary OLS regression gives: 
log( ) 1.02 0.522log( )spread LIQ   with 2 0.28R  .  It should be noted that this 
regression is not intended to make a causal argument but more for illustration purpose.  
Furthermore, liquidity and spread are modelled as endogenous variables – as they are 
determined jointly – later in the analysis.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 While monopolistic or oligopolistic market power is likely to be important in developing economies, it 
has also been emphasised for the deposit market and the setting of the deposit rate in the United States. For 
those studies see Neumark and Sharpe (1992) and Hannan and Berger (1991).   
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Figure 1: Interest rate spread (vertical axis) and bank liquidity ratio (horizontal axis) 
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3. Derivation of the Mark-up Rates   
 
This section assumes an oligopolistic model of the representative banking firm, 
which is assumed to make a choice between investing in loans at home and investing in a 
relatively safe foreign asset. This outcome is not implausible as most developing 
countries do not possess an internationally accepted currency which acts as a medium of 
exchange (a vehicle currency used to settle international payments) or as a store of value 
(an international reserve currency).  Thus the foreign interest rate becomes critical to the 
analysis.  This application of the banking model implies one fundamental difference to 
the framework used by Frexias and Rochet (1999), Hannan (1991) and Klein (1971).  The 
latter authors assumed that the bank takes the domestic Treasury bill rate as given.  While 
this is relevant to the United States, it is not necessarily the case for highly open 
developing economies.  A representative bank in the latter economies has to always 
consider whether to invest a marginal quantity of funds at home in loans or in a relatively 
safe foreign asset like US Treasury bills or even foreign currency deposits in an overseas 
counterpart bank.  Therefore, the bank takes the foreign interest rate as given. 
 
Equation 1 is the representative bank’s profit function that is assumed to be 
concave in loans to the private sector (L); foreign assets (F); and deposits (D).  The i 
subscript attached to each variable signals the quantity of the respective variable held by 
the representative bank.  Other key variables include Lr = the average lending rate; Dr = 
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average deposit rate; Fr = rate of interest on the international security or foreign rate; 
( )ic L = transaction and monitoring costs associated with making loans to private agents; 
and  = a probability function representing the proportion of borrowers (where: 
0 1  ) who are likely to default on their loans.  The bank’s balance sheet identity is 
denoted by equation 2 in which zD = the percentage of deposits kept as total liquid assets, 
which could be remunerated or non-remunerated liquidity (where z = a percentage).  
Since it does not change the analysis fundamentally, assume the nominal exchange rate is 
fixed at 1.    
 
i (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )L i F i D i ir L L r F r D D c L           (1) 
 
i i i izD F L D           (2) 
 
Equation 3 is obtained by solving the balance sheet constraint for Fi and 
substituting into equation 2.   
 
i [(1 ) ( ) ] [ ( ) (1 )] ( )L F i D F i ir L r L r D r z D c L           (3) 
 
i j
i j
L L L

  ; i j
i j
D D D

        (3a) 
 
The analysis follows Freixas and Rochet (1999) by assuming a Cournot oligopoly. In the 
Cournot equilibrium the ith bank maximises profit by taking the volume of loans and 
deposits of other banks as given. In other words, for the ith bank, * *( , )i iL D , solves 
equation 3.  Equation (3a) denotes the aggregate quantity of loans and deposits 
demanded, respectively, by the entire banking sector.  
 
The loan market  
 
Equation 4 is the first order condition after maximising the profit function with 
respect to iL .  The market demand curve the bank faces is downward sloping thus giving 
the elasticity of demand expression in equation (4b).  The symbol L represents the 
bank’s elasticity of demand.    There is a unique equilibrium in which bank i assumes 
* * /iL L N , where N denotes the number of commercial banks that makes up the banking 
sector4.  The expression ( )Lr L represents the first derivative of the loan rate with respect 
to L.  As demonstrated by (4a) it is simply the inverse of ( )LL r .   
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0i L L i F i
i
d r L r L L r c L
dL
              (4)    
 
                                                 
4 The use of N weighs each bank equally. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption for the purpose of 
making the mathematics tractable. Nevertheless, the simplification does not change the conclusion of the 
model.   
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( ) 1/ ( )L Lr L L r          (4a) 
 
( ) /L L Lr L r L           (4b) 
 
Substituting 4a and 4b into the first order condition yields equation 5, which  
shows that the loan rate is a mark up over the foreign rate and the marginal cost of doing 
business, ( )ic L .  The mark up is dependent on the inverse of the product of N and the 
market elasticity of demand ( L ) for loans.  As 1N   there is the case of a monopoly 
and the mark up is highest, while as N   one bank has an infinitesimal share of the 
market; the equilibrium approaches the competitive state in which the mark up 
approaches zero.  The bank also increases the mark up rate once the perceived probability 
of default increases (that is: 1  ).  This mark up rate, moreover, represents the de-
repressed rate that is likely to occur in the period of financial reforms and liberalisation 
when private banks rather than government mandate determine the interest rate.  
 
1(1 ) [ ( )] / (1 )L F i
L
r r c L
N
           (5)  
 
From equation 5 the minimum loan rate is 
 
 min ( )1(1 )(1 )
F i
L
L
r c Lr
N
 

 
 
 
The private sector’s demand for business loans is downward sloping as firms seek 
to maximise the discounted future stream of cash flow (equation 7); where tCF = cash 
flow at time period t, ty = level of physical output; tp = unit price; tW = number of 
workers employed; tw = the wage rate; and tL = the quantity of loans borrowed in time 
period t that goes towards purchasing new capital goods.  The demand for business loans 
is inversely sloping because an increase in Lr  diminishes the present value of CF and 
thus the demand for business credit. The opposite occurs when the minimum mark-up 
lending rate falls.  Note that the foreign interest rate serves as the discount rate because 
instead of investing at home the business owner could invest capital abroad in a relatively 
safe foreign financial asset. 
   
t t t t t L tCF p y wW r L         (6) 
 
0
( )
(1 )
T
t t t t L t
PV t
t F
p y wW r LCF
r
        (7)         
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Equilibrium in the loan market occurs when the minimum rate (given by equation 
5) intersects the demand for business loans.  The loan market equilibrium condition can 
be written as follows 
 
min( , ) ( )P L S LL r L r         (9) 
 
Where PL = the private sector’s demand for business loans and  = a vector of other 
exogenous determinants of the demand for business loans that shift the loan demand 
curve.  The expression  min( )S LL r  represents the loans offered when evaluated at
min
Lr , 
which is given by equation 5. Later in the paper the expression minLr  is represented by a 
horizontal line, which indicates the banks determine the rate and the borrowing public 
accepts it as given.  
 
From equation 5 the following general derivative conditions are assumed to exist:  
 
min ( ) 0L Fr r  , min ( ) 0Lr   , min [ ( )] 0L ir c L   , min ( ) 0Lr N   
 
The demand for loans is inversely related to the loan rate 
 
( ) 0P LL r  . 
 
The deposit market 
 
The deposit rate can be derived in similar manner.  The first order condition is 
represented by equation 10.  Let us assume there is a unique equilibrium in which bank i 
assumes * * /iD D N , where N denotes the number of commercial banks that comprise 
the banking system.  ( )Dr D  represents the first derivative of the deposit rate with respect 
to D.  The public’s elasticity of supply of deposits is given by S  (equation 10b).  
Substituting 10a and 10b into equation 10, and noting the unique equilibrium, gives the 
mark up deposit rate equation 11.     
                  
( ) ( ) (1 ) 0i D D i F
i
d r D r D D r z
dD
           (10) 
 
( ) 1/ ( )D Dr D D r            (10a) 
 
( ) /S D Dr D r D           (10b) 
1(1 ) / (1 )D F
S
r r z
N          (11) 
 
From equation 11 the maximum deposit rate, given the foreign interest rate, banks are 
willing to pay the public is given by 
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max
1(1 )(1 )
F
D
S
rr
z
N

 
 
 
Equation 11 implies the deposit rate approaches the foreign interest rate as 
N  assuming z = 0.  It also implies that the rate is a positive function, everything else 
remaining constant, of the percentage deposits (z) kept by the banking system as liquid 
assets – which can be domestic government securities or non-remunerated excess 
liquidity.  As an aside, note that increasing z could prevent cash from leaving the 
domestic banking system to the extent that capital flight is a function of the deposit rate.  
However, the percentage z is non-binding as the banking system of many developing 
economies is highly liquid (Khemraj 2010 and Saxegaard 2006).  Even if the central bank 
increases or decreases the ratio the system could still hold on to excess liquidity5.  Thus, 
the quantity of liquid assets is endogenous in the model and analysis of this article.    
 
The public’s supply of deposits is upward sloping in the deposit rate-deposit 
quantity space.  This is because the public desires to maximise the discounted future 
stream of returns (R) on deposits given by equation 12.  The return on deposits is a 
function of the deposit rate; this is written in general format as ( )t DR r .  Like firms, 
depositors are likely to consider the foreign rate of interest when making the discount.  
The equilibrium level of deposit is obtained by substituting maxDr into the deposit supply 
function.  Note that PVR equals the present value of the future returns on deposits:     
 
0
( )
(1 )
T
t D
PV t
t F
R rR
r
         (12) 
 
Equations 11 and 12 we could be rewritten in general form and set equal to obtain 
the deposit market equilibrium as follows.   
 
max( , ) ( )D B DDD r D r        (13) 
 
The expression max( )B DD r signals that banks demand all deposits at the maximum rate they 
are willing to pay, while ( , )DDD r  is the public’s supply of deposits. Given equation 11, 
the following derivative conditions can be written in general form: min ( ) 0D Fr r  , 
min ( ) 0Dr z  ,  and min ( ) 0Dr N  .  The term  represents a vector of exogenous shift 
factors that affect the supply of deposits (DD = supply of deposits). In the analysis that 
                                                 
5 One reason for this has to do with notion of a foreign currency constraint, which holds that the desired 
change in foreign asset positions the banks would like to make in time period t is not equal to the actual 
quantities of foreign exchange that exist at time period t (see Khemraj 2009).  Hence, banks are forced to 
hold excess liquidity (a large part of which is non-remunerated).    
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follows the derived deposit rate, maxDr , is represented by a flat line, which suggests banks 
determine the rate and the public accepts it as given.  
 
4. Diagrammatic Analysis 
  
Figure 2 summarises the key ideas examined so far.  The DD curve is upward 
sloping while the demand for business loans ( PL ) is downward sloping.  The public takes 
the minimum mark up lending rate and the maximum deposit rates as given – thus 
depicting the asymmetric nature of the process of interest rate determination.  The latter 
idea is depicted by the flat lines illustrating the mark up loan and deposit rates.  The 
equilibrium quantity of deposits ( *D ) is given at the point where the horizontal line, maxDr , 
intersects the DD line.  Similarly, borrowers also take the mark up loan rate as given and 
the equilibrium quantity loans is determined by the intersection of the horizontal line, 
min
Lr , and the loan demand function.    
 
X and Y are 045 lines used to reflect the equilibrium deposit and loan quantities 
on the horizontal axis unto the vertical axis.  In light of the assumed slopes, the level of 
liquid assets (LA) in the banking system is given by the difference between the optimal 
quantities of deposits and loans – *D and *L .   The quantity of liquid assets, moreover, is 
positively related to the spread (the distance AC ).   
 
 
Distribution 
 
The analysis that follows suggests that surplus and profits are distributed among 
three groups – those who save as deposits, those who borrow for business purposes, and 
the banks (the owners and managers of banks).  The minimum lending minLr acts as a 
constraint on the demand for credit and investment demand as only those who can borrow 
above minLr would obtain credit.  Therefore, borrowers earn the profit surplus represented 
by the area of the triangle PL AB .  
 
Depositors, on the other hand, earn the surplus given by the area of the triangle 
0C C .  This follows from the set up that depositors who would like to earn a rate of 
interest higher than maxDr would not find it possible to do so.  Moreover, by offering savers 
and depositors a deposit rate that is a mark up over the foreign interest rate, banks 
dissuade the public from investing abroad.  The deposit rate enables the banks to mobilise 
deposits for their own domestic lending, place investments in foreign assets and satisfy 
the foreign exchange needs of established customers.  Furthermore, there are transaction 
and information costs that preclude small savers from investing in foreign assets by 
themselves.  Depositors also face a foreign currency constraint – that is a mismatch 
between the desire to save in a foreign currency and finding a quantity of the said foreign 
exchange in the domestic foreign exchange market.        
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Figure 2: Loans, deposits and asymmetric interest rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banks therefore are able to earn the amount denoted 
by: min * max *L F Dr L r F r D     .  The objective of the banking sector in a de-repressed 
banking system is to set minLr  and 
max
Dr in such a manner so as to maintain the spread.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposits (D)  
min
Lr
Loans (L)  L* D* 
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X 
Y 
Interest rate 
Lp 
DD 
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LA 
A 
C 
B 
C
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Exogenous increase in loan demand  
 
Assume that the productivity of real investment in the economy is so increased 
that the demand for business loans shifts outwards (to a new curve PL  ) along a constant 
min
Lr .  The productivity of real investment is set in the vector  ; and assume all the other 
exogenous variables in the model are constant.  The adjustment process is elucidated by 
figure 3.  The opposite result would occur from the negative loan demand shock.  As 
would be expected the business sector increases its surplus, which is now given by the 
area of an enlarged triangle.  One interesting outcome is an increase in loans up to the 
point Bcould be met by substituting business loans for liquid assets.  However, after 
B the banks must again accumulate liquidity positions (that is accumulate liquid assets – 
LA) for various reasons such as to maintain regulation requirements (such are required 
liquidity ratios and capital requirements) or maintain cash reserves to buy foreign 
currencies to invest in foreign assets or service the foreign exchange needs of long 
established customers who might also have borrowed from the banks in the first instance.  
Therefore, expansion of bank credit beyond point B requires the central bank to 
accommodate an expansion of the monetary base.  Once the money multiplier is constant 
this monetary expansion would facilitate the credit expansion when excess liquidity is 
exhausted.   
 
Figure 3: Exogenous increase in loan demand 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposits (D)  
min
Lr
Loans (L)  L* D* 
L*
D*
X 
Y 
Interest rate 
Lp 
DD 
max
Dr
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A 
C 
B B
PL 
C 
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Exogenous shocks to deposits  
 
Factors that could account for the exogenous increase in deposits are domestic 
wage increases, remittances, new-found oil revenues, the prevalence of a large 
underground economy, and monetary policy shocks which alter the quantity of deposits 
via a stable money multiplier (these factors are embedded in the vector  ).  However, it 
should be noted that the money multiplier – which links the monetary base to the broader 
money supply – is an identity with no prescription of causality (Goodhart 2009). 
Therefore, changes inflows of remittances, new oil finds, and so on could engender 
endogenous responses in excess bank reserves, which are a subset of the monetary base.   
 
 
Figure 4: An exogenous deposit shock and liquid assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, let us examine the case of a positive shock while all other factors are 
held constant. A negative shock would involve the opposite outcome.  The increase shifts 
Deposits (D) 
min
Lr
Loans (L)  L* D* 
L*
D*
X 
Y 
Interest rate 
Lp 
DD 
max
Dr
Spread 
LA 
A 
C 
B 
DD
LA
C 
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outward the deposit curve DD to DD (see figure 4).  In this case, the extra deposits 
would not necessarily expand business loans as this is dependent on many factors 
independent of the banks.  These extra funds could be stored as liquid assets and excess 
liquidity by the banking sector.   
 
As noted earlier, this tendency is well documented in the recent literature that 
focuses on the issue of excess bank liquidity.  Consequently, liquid assets increase from 
LA to LA .  In addition, the hoards of liquid assets and reserves enable banks to purchase 
foreign exchange once the foreign currencies are available in the domestic foreign 
exchange market.  However, there could be a foreign currency constraint – meaning the 
mismatch of available foreign currencies and the demand for these currencies (Khemraj 
2009).  Nevertheless, these shocks do not alter the spread but they increase the financial 
surplus of the depositors.   
 
Change in ( )c L and  in the loan market 
 
( )c L and  are two exogenous variables in the system. To analyse how a change 
in either one of them affects spread and liquidity requires shifting up or down the minLr  
line.  The analysis is done by performing the case where either ( )c L and  increases.   
These results are summarised in figure 5 where the minLr line shifts upward to 
min
Lr
 .   
 
Interest rate policy 
 
In this section, the paper addresses the question of to what extent a policy of 
interest rate control could influence financial intermediation by increasing loans to 
businesses and reducing excess liquidity.  It should be noted that when government fixes 
interest rate it takes away the prerogative of asymmetric market power of the banking 
sector.  However, the impact of interest rate control on financial intermediation is largely 
dependent on the relative elasticity of the public’s deposit demand (with respect to the 
deposit and/or the savings rate) and the business sector’s loan demand (relative to the 
lending rate).   
 
Figure 6 presents the case of a reduction of the loan rate – assuming the deposit 
rate remains uncontrolled – from minLr to LCr (note LCr = the controlled loan rate).  It is 
assumed that the change in the loan rate has no effect on the deposit rate (this assumption 
will be relaxed later in the paper).  The diagram suggests that the expansion of credit and 
the reduction of excess liquidity depend on the business sector’s elasticity of demand for 
loans.  Note that Lp2 represents a loan demand curve that is relatively more elastic than 
Lp1.  Should the policy be successful in diminishing all excess bank liquidity at the point 
where L2* = D*, interest rate control would have to be accompanied with accommodative 
monetary policy of an expansion of bank deposits by the central bank.  Otherwise, 
business credit expansion will cease at L2*.   
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Figure 5: The effects of a change in  and ( )c L    
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Figure 6: The effects of loan rate control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An alternative policy could be to make private investments more productive so as 
to shift out the demand curve rather than manipulate the lending rate.  As implied by 
figure 6, the expansion of credit results from the movement along the demand curve; a 
shift in the curve, on the other hand, owing to industrial policies that make private 
investments more productive and profitable could be an alternative to interest rate 
control.  However, to the extent the marginal cost of banking, ( )c L , is affected by the 
inefficiencies in the economic system and these are diminished by the policy framework, 
then such policies would enhance financial intermediation6.  In addition, business 
investment surplus increases when there is an outward shift of the demand curve.                  
                                                 
 
6 Note here that the cost of banking is assumed to be affected by the cost structure of the real economy.   
Deposits (D) 
min
Lr
Loans (L)  L* D*
L*
D* 
X Y 
Interest rate 
L1* 
Lp1 
Lp2 
DD1
DD2 
LCr
L2* L1* 
L2*
max
Dr
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Figure 7: Deposit rate control that affects the loan rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 outlines the effect of a policy mandate that increases the deposit rate.  
However, it is assumed banks would seek to maintain a mark-up between the loan and 
deposit rates.  Therefore, as the deposit rate is increased from maxDr to DCr the loan rate 
adjusts accordingly (but not necessarily in the same proportion).  The degree of the 
increase in the society’s deposit supply depends on the elasticity.  On the asset side, the 
demand for loans declines – with the extent of the decline being sensitive to the elasticity. 
It is obvious from the diagram that the policy of increasing the interest rate reduces 
financial intermediation and increases excess liquidity.  What occurs when the loan rate is 
also controlled to remain at minLr ?  In the latter case financial intermediation is not 
necessarily increased even though the policy is successful in mobilising deposits.  
However, financial intermediation could be increased by policies that engender an 
outward shift in the demand for loans rather than a movement along the demand curve.       
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5. Conclusion 
 
This article applied the established banking model of Klein (1971) and Frexias 
and Rochet (1999) to developing economies taking into consideration the very liquid 
nature of the banking industry and the persistently high loan-deposit rate spread in these 
economies.  Moreover, the article was not intended to present a new theoretical oligopoly 
model of the banking firm. Rather the intention was less ambitious whereby an 
established oligopoly theoretical framework was utilised to examine financial 
intermediation, excess bank liquidity, and distribution in a banking context. The loan and 
deposit rates were derived as a mark up over a relatively safe foreign interest rate.  
Therefore, the foreign rate anchors the domestic structure of interest rates and it is the 
truly exogenous interest rate.  Moreover, the paper proposed the idea that banks possess 
the ability to determine the loan and deposit rates, while the public accepts the rates as 
given – hence the notion of asymmetric market power.         
 
The model was used to analyse the distribution of financial surplus among banks, 
depositors and borrowers.  In a de-repressed financial system, the private oligopolistic 
banks would tend to maintain the spread in order to transfer surplus to themselves from 
depositors and borrowers. It was suggested that exogenous loan demand and deposit 
demand shocks change the distribution of financial surplus and lead to changes in 
intermediation although spread remains constant.  The analysis also suggested that 
spread, distribution and financial intermediation would respond to changes in the 
marginal cost of banking and the probability of loan default.  Finally, the paper also 
examined the effectiveness of interest rate control on financial intermediation and excess 
liquidity.  The key insight is that a policy of loan and/or deposit rate control depends on 
the relative effectiveness of the society’s deposit supply elasticity versus the elasticity of 
demand for loans.   
 
This article did not address three issues that are the are the subject of future 
research: (i) the behaviour of bank liquidity preference and its implication for real output; 
(ii) the mechanism determining the demand for foreign assets by commercial banks; and 
(iii) the addition of foreign exchange risk to the oligopoly model of the banking firm.   
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Appendix 1 
 
List of countries on which figure 1 is based:  
 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Estonia, 
Fiji, Georgia, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Korea (Republic 
of), Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Solomon Island, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia.  
